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Size, Density and Small Scale Elections:  





What are the consequences of fragmenting political and administrative authority within 
municipalities? Portugal provides an excellent setting to study the effects of sub-city 
institutional fragmentation because each of its 308 municipal governments is divided into 
sub-municipal governments (SMUs). The 4,259 SMUs deliver services to the residents 
and its executive leader serves on the city council. In this paper we investigate the 
determinants of voter turnout in these SMUs. We argue that the size and density of SMUs 
affects electoral participation, but this effect is mediated by the municipal context. High 
levels of population concentration and low levels of territorial fragmentation at the 
municipal level are expected to improve voter mobilization efforts and mitigate the 
negative effect of size and density on voter turnout. Hierarchical linear analysis of 
municipal and SMU data finds strong support for size and density effects and moderate 
support for multilevel relationships. 
 










Size, Density and Small Scale Elections:  
A Multi-Level Analysis of Voter Turnout in Sub-Municipal Governments 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent studies suggest that local political participation is a function of the size and 
concentration of a jurisdiction’s population. Most of this research focuses on the idea that 
there is an “optimal” size and concentration of population that favours active political 
participation in terms of higher propensity to vote in local elections, contact local 
officials and attend community meetings (Oliver 2001). The conventional argument 
suggests a negative relationship between jurisdiction size and political participation 
(Oliver 2001), mitigated to some extent by the deeper social interactions generated by 
higher population density (Tavares and Carr 2013, 2014). 
These studies have been conducted at the municipal level, often ignoring the fact 
that, in many countries, municipalities are themselves divided into sub-municipal 
governments that are elected. Recent contributions attempt to mitigate the paucity of 
research on sub-municipal governments (Swianiewicz, 2014; Tavares and Rodrigues 
2015; Hlepas et al. 2018) but fail to explain how these systems might affect political 
participation in general and voter turnout at the sub-municipal unit (SMU) level in 
particular. 
Our paper addresses this gap in the existing literature and investigates – both 
theoretically and empirically − the determinants of electoral participation in SMUs. 
Drawing on existing research, we develop a set of hypotheses. We argue that population 
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size and density of SMUs negatively affect the propensity to vote, but this effect is 
mediated by the municipal context where these SMUs operate. First, the level of 
population concentration1 in a single or few SMUs mitigates the negative effects of both 
size and density on voter turnout, because these SMUs will have the institutional capacity 
to address larger policy questions, much in the same way a municipality would. In 
addition, population concentration reduces the spatial mismatch between problems and 
venues with the authority and resources to develop and implement solutions (Kelleher 
and Lowery 2004). In turn, excessive territorial fragmentation of a municipality into 
SMUs is expected to have a negative effect on electoral participation, since it increases 
the likelihood that dissatisfied citizens will find an alternative SMU that better matches 
their preferences. This reduces the investment benefit from voting, given that the 
existence of a wider range of location options makes the 'exit' option more credible and 
diminishes the relevance of ‘voice’ as an alternative form of participation in local 
politics, as suggested in the voice-substitution hypothesis proposed by Kelleher and 
Lowery (2004). 
We test the hypotheses using the case of Portugal. The Portuguese case constitutes 
an excellent opportunity to study the effects of municipal and sub-municipal factors on 
voter turnout in SMUs. First, in terms of the existence of SMUs, Portugal stands out as 
the extreme case: all its municipalities have SMUs. At the other extreme there are some 
countries (e.g. Belgium and Norway) where only one city has a sub-municipal level, 
																																																								
1 Kelleher and Lowery (2004: 730) define the level of population concentration as “how dispersed the 
population of the metropolitan area is across the local governments within it”, Here, we adapt this 
definition to mean how dispersed the population of the municipality is across the sub-municipal 
governments within it. 
5	
	
whereas many countries fall in between (e.g. Spain, Greece, the Czech Republic, 
England, Germany, Poland) (Hlepas et al. 2018). Second, although in most countries in 
Europe that have SMUs, there are district elections at the SMU level (except urban SMUs 
in Spain and varying practices between SMUs in Slovenia and England) (Hlepas et al. 
2018), the legislative framework gives the municipal level considerable freedom in 
defining these electoral rules, whereas in Portugal, SMUs are subjected to similar 
electoral rules. Finally, in many countries, there is an enormous range of sub-municipal 
structures used to deliver local services, whereas the homogeneity of sub-municipal 
institutions in Portugal provides a unique opportunity for comparative analysis. 
Portugal’s 308 local governments are subdivided into 4,259 civil parishes (freguesias). 
These sub-municipal governments are autonomous democratic institutions that have 
elected councils and chief executives. They receive funding from the national 
government and the municipal governments but also raise a portion of their budgets from 
own-source revenues. They have the authority to determine the levels of selected services 
for the residents living within the SMU. 
The empirical analysis employs a multilevel model to test the hypotheses developed 
in the theoretical discussion, taking as the unit of analysis the 4,259 SMUs (level 1 units) 
distributed over 308 municipalities (level 2 units). Hierarchical linear analysis of data for 
municipal and sub-municipal governments finds strong support for size and density 
effects and moderate support for multilevel relationships. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section presents the theoretical 
discussion and develops the hypotheses. The third section describes the context of our 
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study. Data and methods are presented in section four and the findings reported in section 
five.  The final section outlines our conclusions and discusses implications for future 
research. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
The political science literature recognizes the complex relationship between 
jurisdiction size, population concentration, and political participation. This section draws 
on general theoretical arguments and prior empirical findings to develop hypotheses 
about electoral participation in SMUs as the first step and then discusses the influence of 
the municipal setting on SMU voter turnout as the second step. 
2.1. Size, Density, and Electoral Participation 
From the perspective of an individual, the decision to vote is influenced by 
expected benefits and costs (e.g. Downs 1957; Brennan and Lomasky 1997; Fiorina 
1976; Matsusaka 1995; Riker and Ordeshook 1068; Struthers and Young 1989). One of 
the most often-used equations employed for characterizing that decision is:  
R = PB + D – C 
Where: R = the reward for voting B = investment benefits, D = consumption 
benefits, and C = costs. 
The investment (also called instrumental) benefit of voting (B) entails the benefit 
the voter gains from having their preferred candidate or party win (Kaniovski and 
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Mueller 2006). The consumption benefits (also called ‘expressive’ benefits by Fiorina 
(1976)) refer to the gratification gained from the act of voting itself: experiencing the 
entertainment value of the occasion, the desire to express their preferences, the 
affirmation of group solidarity, the feeling of fulfilling a civic duty, or the influence of 
peer pressure (e.g. Brennan and Lomasky 1997; Kaniovski and Mueller 2006; Riker and 
Ordeshook 1968; Schuessler 2000; Struthers and Young 1989).  
The size of the jurisdiction is likely to influence both the instrumental and 
consumption benefits of voting. According to the ‘rational voter’ model (Downs 1957), 
the expected investment benefit of voting increases with the probability of affecting the 
election result, which, in turn, is influenced by the size of the population: the smaller the 
population, the higher the probability of casting the decisive vote (Geys 2006; Riker and 
Ordeshook 1968). Thus, the smaller the population of the jurisdiction, the higher the 
voter turnout is likely to be since few votes can make a difference and voters feel they 
can influence the outcome of the election (Wood 2002). Municipal size is also likely to 
affect the consumption benefits associated with voting, although here the effect could go 
both ways. On the one hand, smaller size could lead to higher turnout. A smaller polity 
may offer citizens a greater sense of solidarity and sense of belonging (Dahl and Tufte 
1973). In smaller communities, elected representatives are seen as friends and 
neighbours, who reflect community values and respond to the needs of the residents 
(Ross and Levine 2001). All of these increase the social pressure and perceived duty to 
vote (Ladner 2002) and lead to a loss of social prestige or reputation for individuals who 
do not participate in elections (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Oberbye 1995). In contrast, in 
larger communities, political life tends to be more impersonal and distant (Verba and Nie 
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1972) and the elected officials become viewed as detached and unresponsive officials 
(Ross and Levine 2001), leading to lower voter turnout. In smaller jurisdictions, residents 
are more animated by local issues and can be more easily mobilized to vote (Oliver and 
Ha 2007; Oliver 2012). It has also been argued that voters feel ‘less qualified’ to 
participate in elections if the district size increases (Lassen and Serritzlew 2011; Oliver 
2001). The larger the jurisdiction, the more complex the government, and hence the more 
important the individual skills and resources necessary for civic participation, including 
voting (Oliver 2001). On the other hand, elections in a larger jurisdiction are likely to 
provide voters with a larger choice set of candidates, making it more likely that they find 
a candidate who fits their preferences (Dahl and Tufte 1973), which is likely to increase 
turnout.  
The existing empirical evidence provides extensive support for the negative effect 
of population size on voter turnout, especially at the subnational level (Cancela and Geys 
2016; Carr and Tavares 2014; Geys 2006; Sellers et al. 2013), although there are also 
some studies that fail to substantiate that claim (e.g. for overviews, see Cancela and Geys 
2016 and Geys 2006). In the Portuguese context, Tavares and Carr (2013) analyze civic 
participation activities in the 278 municipalities of continental Portugal and find that 
population size is negatively correlated with voter turnout. They conclude that the effect 
of population size on electoral participation can be summarized in the general principle 
that residents in larger cities are less socially connected with their neighbors, less 
interested in local politics and less active in local civic affairs. 
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In addition to the sheer size of the jurisdiction, the individual’s choice to participate 
in the election can also be influenced by the population density, referring to population 
per square kilometer.  Population density is likely to influence the expressive (or 
consumption) benefits and also costs related to voting. On the one hand, it can be argued 
that the lower the population density, the higher the turnout rate. First, in low-density 
areas, elections are likely to be more ‘personal’ (which reduces the information costs 
involved in deciding between the candidates) (Blank 1974; Geys 2006; Oliver 2012). 
Second, in low-density areas there is more likely to be ‘social pressure’ (i.e. higher 
expressive benefits) to vote than in more anonymous high density areas, where there are 
weaker social bonds (e.g., Hoffman-Martinot 1994; Oliver 2012; Overbye 1995). On the 
other hand, in high density areas (which are usually urban), there are more opportunities 
for interaction, civic engagement, mobilization, and hence also more group pressure to 
vote, which may have a positive effect on turnout (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Kelleher 
and Lowery 2004; Tavares and Carr 2013). In line with the diverging theoretical 
predictions, the existing empirical evidence for the effect of population density is mixed 
(for overviews, see Geys 2006; Cancela and Geys 2016). 
Tavares and Carr (2013) argue that the lack of empirical support for the density 
hypothesis is due to the failure of prior studies to properly examine the mediation effects 
of density on the relationship between population size and voter turnout. They argue that 
higher population density can mitigate the negative effect of scale in larger jurisdictions 
through group mobilization and thus increase the likelihood of participation (Tavares and 
Carr 2013). Population density can facilitate the creation of dense social networks that 
encourage participation, including voting. Neighbors in close proximity are more likely 
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to come into contact, to share concerns about common problems, and to get organized for 
civic action (Stein and Dillingham 2004). In addition, proximity facilitates mobilization 
by allowing significant cost savings in communication and information dissemination.  
This argument is supported by their study of Michigan cities, where Carr and Tavares 
(2014) find that population density can mitigate the negative effect of population size and 
increase the likelihood of voting. 
Given the ambivalent theoretical predictions and mixed set of findings concerning 
the effects of size and density on electoral participation, the hypotheses about the effects 
on voter turnout at sub-municipal elections are not expressed in terms of a positive or 
negative expectation:    
H1: Population size of SMUs affects voter turnout rates. 
H2: Population density of SMUs affects voter turnout rates. 
H3: Population density has a contingent effect on the relationship between SMU size and 
voter turnout rates. 
 
2.2. Territorial Fragmentation, Population Concentration, and Electoral 
Participation 
When examining voter turnout at the sub-municipal elections, it would also be 
relevant to explore the effects of the territorial fragmentation of the municipality (i.e. the 
number of sub-municipal units in it) and the concentration of population (i.e., how 
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dispersed the population of the municipality is between the sub-municipal units) since 
these aspects are likely to influence the benefits of voting.   
According to the argument derived from public choice theory, it is not the size or 
other features of the jurisdiction itself that matters but the configuration of the local 
political economy (Oakerson 1999; Oakerson and Parks 2011). The presence of a large 
number of SMUs increases the likelihood of dissatisfied citizens finding an alternative 
that better matches their preferences, which reduces the investment benefit from voting. 
The existence of a wider range of location options makes the 'exit' option more credible, 
diminishing the relevance of ‘voice’ as an alternative form of participation in local 
politics. This is the voice substitution hypothesis suggested by Kelleher and Lowery 
(2004; 2008). The credibility of the 'exit option' does not require that a large number of 
citizens routinely 'vote with their feet'. Rather, it is the threat of the 'exit option' that 
matters politically (Schneider 1989) and this increases as the number of jurisdictions also 
increases.  
Although the level of territorial fragmentation has been the subject of interest in the 
literature of political participation in the U.S. context (Kelleher and Lowery 2004)2 to 
date, no empirical work has focused on how the level of sub-municipal fragmentation 
affects voter turnout in these smaller jurisdictions. In this particular instance, Portugal 
provides quite a contrasting case to the U.S., for at least two reasons3. First, Portugal is 
																																																								
2 Kelleher and Lowery (2004, 2008) explore how municipal fragmentation influences voter turnout at the 
municipal level, whereas our focus is the turnout at the SMU level.  
3 We are grateful to a reviewer for pointing these out to us. 
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characterized by a relatively high rate of home ownership, but the residential mobility 
rate is one of the lowest in Europe according to Eurostat4. This combination of features 
suggests that, unlike their U.S. counterparts, Portuguese citizens are much less likely to 
‘vote with their feet’. Second, the main (and the majority) of local government 
attributions are located at the municipal level of government, not the SMU level, thus 
creating less pressure for citizens to move inside their municipality. Nevertheless, the 
dual local government system allows us to test these possibilities regarding exit versus 
voice options in a novel context. We will test this hypothesis in the Portuguese context 
with this caveat in mind.  
According to the voice substitution hypothesis, we can expect that: 
H4: SMUs in more fragmented municipalities are likely to display lower turnout rates. 
Besides territorial fragmentation, the level of population concentration in a municipality 
is also likely to affect electoral participation in their SMUs (Kelleher and Lowery 2008). 
Population can be highly concentrated in a large city center, with relatively small 
suburbs, or evenly distributed across a number of SMUs of similar size. If the population 
is evenly distributed across the SMUs that compose the municipality, we can expect very 
different outcomes from a situation where the population is concentrated in only one or 
few SMUs. Drawing on the argument from the new regionalists, Kelleher and Lowery 







participation, but how effective is the scope of local government in dealing with the 
problems faced by the community in this area. Thus, participation will increase in heavily 
concentrated municipalities, since at least one jurisdiction will have the scale of political 
competence that better matches the scale of the problems to be addressed (Kelleher and 
Lowery 2004: 730), thus potentially increasing the investment benefits of voting.5 In 
addition, population concentration in one SMU is also likely to lead to positive spillovers 
across other SMUs inside the same municipality, leading to increased participation. 
According to this argument, the hypothesis predicts that:  
H5: SMUs in more concentrated cities are likely to display higher voter turnout rates. 
2.3. Cross-Level Interaction Hypotheses 
In the previous subsections, we defined the hypotheses concerning the direct causal 
relationships between our explanatory variables and electoral participation. This section 
derives two hypotheses resulting from the interaction between variables at both levels of 
analysis. The first hypothesis suggests that sub-municipal fragmentation has an impact on 
the negative relationship between parish size and electoral participation. The direction of 
this effect is directly derived from H4. If we believe that the availability of a large number 
of location options makes the 'exit' option more credible and reduces the relevance of 
‘voice’ (voting) as an alternative form of participation in local politics, then sub-
municipal fragmentation will have a negative effect on the relationship between SMU 
																																																								
5 Kelleher and Lowery’s empirical findings suggest that “although not [statistically] significant, the 
estimate for this interaction is negative, indicating that it is the turnout in smaller cities that increases the 
most as concentration levels rise.” (2004: 748). 
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size and electoral participation. In other words, large SMUs in highly fragmented 
municipalities will display lower turnout rates. 
H6: Territorial fragmentation at the municipal level deepens the negative effect of 
population size on voter turnout rates at the SMU level. 
Our final hypothesis argues that population concentration has the potential to 
mitigate the negative effect of size on SMU electoral participation. The reason is that the 
concentration of population in a single or a few SMUs is likely to produce one or more 
jurisdictions that are better able to address larger scale policy issues (Kelleher and 
Lowery 2004; 2008). Taking this argument to the limit, SMU-municipal government 
‘consolidation’ provides the best setting to mitigate the negative effects of size. In fact, 
this is also compatible with H6, since the positive effect of this type of consolidation is 
consistent with a mitigating effect of low levels of fragmentation (H6).  
H7: Population concentration at the municipal level mitigates the negative effect of 
population size on voter turnout rates at the SMU level. 
 
3. Research Context: The Portuguese Local Government System 
The unique nature of the Portuguese local government system and the analysis of 
cross-level interaction effects on SMUs electoral participation require a brief account of 
SMUs and municipal governments and their role in the Portuguese local government 
system. 
3.1. Sub-Municipal Governments (Freguesias) 
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The freguesias are the smallest unit of local self-government in Portugal and their 
boundaries are completely contained within a single municipality. The number of SMUs 
per municipality varies significantly, ranging from one (in five municipalities6), where 
the boundary of the freguesia coincides with the boundary of the municipality, up to 89 
(Barcelos), where each SMU is essentially equivalent to a neighborhood government. 
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the extent of this sub-municipal polycentricity in Portuguese 
municipalities. Table 1 shows that some SMUs are extremely small: 177 (4.16%) have 
less than 150 registered voters and 1,989 (46.79%) have between 150 and 1,000 
registered voters. Table 2 demonstrates that the variation in SMU size is also territorial: 
almost half of the freguesias have less than 10 square kilometers and only a couple of 
hundred are larger than 50 square kilometers. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
SMUs have democratically elected leaders, including both an executive and a 
legislative body. The SMU council (Assembleia de Freguesia) is a deliberative body 
elected by the municipality’s registered voters residing in the territory of the freguesia. 
SMU council size is determined according to the rules in Table 3. The SMU executive 
(Junta de Freguesia) is composed of the president and a variable number of cabinet 
members, two of which will serve as secretary and treasurer. The SMU president is the 
first candidate on the list receiving most votes to the SMU council. The size of each SMU 
executive also varies according to the number of registered voters. The rules are also 
presented in Table 3. 
																																																								
6 Alpiarça, Barrancos, Porto Santo, São Brás de Alportel e São João da Madeira. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
The responsibilities of SMUs are assigned by law and include the management of 
rural and urban infrastructure, preschool and elementary school buildings, cemeteries, 
public kennels, and vacant lands. SMUs also have powers assigned by national legislation 
to engage in emergency management, planning, and community development. In some 
cases, municipal governments delegate tasks to SMUs, including funding and managing 
physical infrastructure.  
3.2. Municipalities 
Mayors in Portugal are elected as the head of their party’s lists. Local elections are 
mostly partisan although citizen organizations can present lists. One of the unique traits 
of the executive branch of local government is the formation of minority executives, a 
product of multiparty elections and proportional representation. On rare occasions, the 
winning party (and the mayor in office) may not have the majority of members in the 
cabinet executive. Municipal councils are responsible for budget approval, set up land use 
plans, sell municipal bonds, set municipal tax rates, and approve local ordinances and 
regulations. National legislation imposes a mixed composition of the municipal council 
combining SMU presidents and at-large elected members. SMU presidents can never 
outnumber council members elected at-large. As a general rule, the number of members 
elected at-large exceeds in one the number of SMU representatives. Consequently, 
municipal council size varies with the level of fragmentation of the municipality in 
SMUs. In municipalities with only a few SMUs, the minimum number of council 
members elected is 15, corresponding to three times the number of members of the 
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municipal executive. Table 4 displays the number of SMUs per municipality in Portugal 
(including the Azores and Madeira islands). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The Portuguese context provides an excellent opportunity to measure the effects of sub-
municipal fragmentation because the city council structure based on the number of SMUs 
was established by national legislation in 1976 and has remained unchanged for the past 
38 years. In this context, sub-municipal fragmentation can be treated as exogenous by 
empirical models, since the factors accounting for the choice of government structures 
are uncorrelated with civic and political participation levels.  
 
4. Data and Methods 
This research follows a non-experimental design with cross-sectional data. The unit 
of analysis is the population of Portuguese SMUs (4,259 in total). We seek to identify 
and test the determinants of electoral participation at the sub-municipal level. The central 
argument is that the level of electoral participation is not only determined by a set of 
explanatory variables at the SMU level (level 1) but also by factors present at the 
municipal level (level 2). It is expected that SMUs belonging to the same municipality 
will exhibit similar levels of participation, so that contextual variables at the municipal 
level provide an additional explanation for the variation across SMUs. Furthermore, we 
also expect cross-level interactions between variables at both levels. 
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The terminology of hierarchical linear models (HLM) is adequate to describe the 
structure of the Portuguese local government system. The 308 municipalities (level 2 
units) are subdivided into 4,259 SMUs (level 1 units). The widespread use of a single 
level of analysis to test hypotheses in an intergovernmental context such as this is largely 
explained by the absence of sufficient data to allow the construction of multilevel 
explanations. Models using a single level of analysis to study hierarchical data are 
inadequate because they fail to provide an accurate theoretical account of reality and 
because they involve serious statistical problems leading to biased results (Lee and Bryk 
1989; Raudenbush and Bryk 1986, 2002). As stated by Cho et al. (2006: 159), “the main 
difficulty with the traditional linear model for (this type of) data is that it rests on a basic 
assumption of independence”, even though our SMU observations are grouped in 
municipalities. Zhu (1997) argues that for hierarchical data structures such as those 
studied here, the unit of analysis should be extended to include more than one level. In 
other words, in multilevel analysis, the variation in the dependent variable measured at 
the lowest level of analysis includes information on more than one level of analysis 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002). 
Three reasons justify the use of HLMs to analyze intergovernmental relations at the 
local level. First, HLM accounts for the factors that determine turnout in Portuguese 
SMUs embedded in their municipalities, allowing the inclusion of explanatory variables 
at different levels in a single comprehensive model (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). In the 
intergovernmental context, this means that the electoral participation in SMUs varies both 
within and between municipalities. Failure to account for the variables at the municipal 
level would result in the underestimation of standard errors and type I errors 
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(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The second theoretical reason relates to how the 
explanatory factors at the municipal level can interact with those at the SMU level to 
shape electoral participation. This problem is known in the political science literature as 
causal heterogeneity (Western 1998), describing the possibility of cross-level 
interactions, and in this case, the variation of coefficients of SMU-level predictors as a 
function of municipal-level characteristics. Finally, the use of a single level of analysis in 
presence of hierarchical data often leads to aggregation bias as a result of the combination 
of data at a higher level of analysis, ignoring that a variable can have different meanings 
and effects at different levels. HLMs take into account the separate effects of similar 
variables by including the observed relationships between variables into separate level-1 
and level-2 components (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). 
We analyze electoral participation in the 2009 SMU council elections in the 4,259 
SMUs in the 308 Portuguese municipalities using the HLM following the standard form:  
Yij = β0j + β1jX1ij + εij  (1) 
 
Where Yij is the dependent variable of SMU i (= 1, ..., Nj) nested in municipality j (= 1,. 
.., J). The term X1ij is an independent variable observed at the SMU level and εij is the 
residual at the SMU level. In practice, the model is identical in all respects to the single 
level regression model, except for the fact that it allows for variation in the parameters 
across the second-level units, as indicated by the indexes j and parameters β0j and β1j. At 
level 2, the individual regression parameters are modeled as functions of the explanatory 
factors at the municipal level. Here we derive, 
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β0j = γ0o + γ01Z1j + δ0j   (2) 
And 
β1j = γ1o + γ11Zj + δ1j  (3) 
The equations above represent the second level, where the parameter Z1j in equation (2) 
affects Yij and varies only across and not within municipalities with some error δ0j. 
Equation (3) represents the interaction between Xij and Z1j to determine the outcome, Yij. 
The complete model is obtained by substituting the expressions in equation (1). Thus: 
Yij = γ0o + γ01Zj + δ0j + (γ1o + γ11Zj + δ1j)Xij + εij 
 
= γ0o + γ01Zj + γ1oXij + γ11ZjXij + δ0j + δ1jXij + εij 
Where γ0o is the constant, γ01 denotes the effect of the independent variable at level 2 
(municipality), γ1o is the effect of the independent variable at the SMU level, γ11 is the 
interaction effect between levels 1 and 2, i.e., the interaction between the factors at the 
SMU and municipal levels with the residual terms represented by δ0j , δ1j and εij. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the voter turnout for each SMU council in the 2009 local 
elections (Yij) measured as the number of voters over the total registered voters in each 
SMU unit. Only 4,117 elections were held for the SMU councils. The remaining 142 




In order to analyze the effects of jurisdiction size and population density in 
electoral participation we include population (X1j) and population density (X2j) as level 1 
variables. The first variable is measured by the natural log of sub-municipal population in 
order to meet the assumption of normality. Density is measured as the sub-municipal 
population per square kilometer, also in natural log form. The effect of density on the 
relationship between population size and electoral participation is also tested, following 
suggestions by Stein and Dillingham (2004) and Tavares and Carr (2013). 
Territorial fragmentation is measured by the natural log of the number of SMUs per 
municipality (Xi3). The unlogged values indicate that the mean fragmentation level is 13.4 
parishes per municipality ranging from a minimum of 1 in two municipalities and a 
maximum of 89. Population concentration is measured by a Herfindahl index. The mean 
concentration level is .14, the standard deviation is .11 and the index ranges from a 
minimum of .02 to a maximum of 1. Concentration levels are generally low, with the 
obvious exception of municipalities with only one SMU. The simple correlations between 
our theoretical variables are negligible. SMU size and municipal fragmentation (.014), 
SMU size and concentration (.05), and fragmentation and concentration (-.035) are all 
barely correlated. As expected, the only exception to these values is the strong correlation 
between SMU size and density (.76). 
 
Control Variables 
The analysis includes two sets of control variables. The first group includes several 
socioeconomic characteristics of the SMUs and municipalities: age, education, income, 
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and religion. Age (X3j) is measured by the proportion of population over 65 years-old in 
each SMU unit. The models also include Age as a level 2 predictor (Xi5) measured as the 
municipal population over 65 years-old. A negative coefficient is expected, assuming that 
the propensity to vote decreases in the last stage of the life-cycle (Blais et al. 2004). 
Education (X4j) is the proportion of SMU population with high school education7. A 
positive coefficient is expected (Squire et al. 1987; Verba et al. 1995; Blais and 
Dobrzynska 1998). Income (Xi7) and Religiousness (Xi10) are measured by proxies at the 
municipal level: the average monthly earnings and the proportion of Catholic weddings, 
respectively. The use of data at the municipal level for the religiousness variable is also 
due to the unavailability of information at the SMU level. This variable should present a 
positive relationship with electoral participation because it can also be regarded as a 
direct empirical measure of the construct of social connectedness (Blais et al. 2004; 
Freire and Magalhães 2002; Magalhães 2001; Tavares and Carr 2013; Timpone 1998). 
We also include municipal population size (Xi1) and density (Xi2) as level 2 controls to 
provide context for electoral participation at the SMU level. A dummy variable (X8j) is 
included indicating all SMUs located in the Azores and Madeira Islands. A negative 
coefficient is expected due to the presence of an intermediate (regional) level of 
government, which may diminish the relevance of local elections in these archipelagos8. 
																																																								
7 Education is not included at the municipal level due to missing data in a few municipalities resulting in 
the loss of 112 observations. We included this variable in specification A (see Appendix A). The sign of the 
variable is positive and consistent with the prediction included in Table 5 and the findings for the same 
variable at the municipal level. 
8 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility to us. Another reviewer also 
stresses the divide between coastal and inland municipalities in Portugal. In our opinion, the Interiority 
variable suggested by this reviewer cannot fully capture the argument of remoteness and lack of prosperity 
of inland Portugal. Instead, we included the variable ‘Urban Land Use’, which is better able to grasp this 
23	
	
The second set of controls refers to political variables. Interparty competition is 
measured by the difference in percentage points between the winner and the runner-up in 
each SMU election, i.e., the margin of victory (X5j). A negative coefficient is expected as 
more competitive elections should stimulate voter turnout (Franklin 2003; Wood 2002). 
The HLM also includes the margin of victory in mayoral elections (Xi9) and electoral 
participation in mayoral elections (Xi11)9 as level 2 political controls. Political 
fragmentation (X6j) is measured as the number of candidates in each parish election and a 
negative coefficient is expected. The argument is that an increase in the number of 
candidates decreases the investment benefits of voters due to the potential formation of 
post-election coalitions and party alliances (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Jackman 1987; 
Jackman and Miller 1995; Kostadinova 2003). Furthermore, it increases the complexity 
of the political system (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998), implying higher decision-making 
costs for the voters. The number of candidates without a national party affiliation (X7j) is 
also included and a positive coefficient is expected, given that independent lists might be 
able to mobilize otherwise apolitical voters (Aars and Ringkjob 2005; Freire et al. 2012). 
Finally, we included a variable to account for media competition in the municipality (Xi8). 
The rationale for this is that increased competition reduces information asymmetry 
between candidates and voters and improves participation (Downs 1957; Filla and 
Johnson 2010; Squire and Smith 1988). The variable is measured as the sum of local 
newspapers and radio stations and is expected to have a positive coefficient, assuming 
																																																																																																																																																																					
idea. Specification B in Appendix A reports the results for this variable, showing that, all else equal, urban 
areas are more likely to display higher turnout rates at the SMU level. 
9 Given that the elections for the municipal assembly (deliberative body), municipal executive and SMU 
assembly take place simultaneously, it is important to control for voter turnout at the municipal level.  
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that greater disclosure and dissemination of information contributes to increased 
participation in local elections. All variables, indicators, sources and expected signs are 
included in Table 5. 
[Insert table 5 here] 
5. Empirical Findings  
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for our level-1 and level-2 variables. The 
average of the dependent variable – electoral participation in sub-municipal elections – is 
65.54%, ranging between a minimum of 31.36% and a maximum of 92.11% with a 
standard deviation of 9.5, suggesting a normal distribution for this variable.10 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The inferential analysis conducted in this section takes an incremental approach. It 
begins with a simple model without any predictor variables (the reference model) and 
builds increasingly complex estimations. The “optimal model” is given by the likelihood 
ratio test, which compares the goodness of fit of a more complex model with the quality 
of the adjustment of a simpler model, nested in the first. In other words, the objective is 
to maximize the likelihood function, which is the probability of observing the values of 
the dependent variable based on the validity of the assumptions of the model. There are 
two functions used in HLMs: classical maximum likelihood (ML) and restricted 
																																																								
10 For the sake of brevity we abstain from describing in detail the statistics of the independent and control 
variables included in the analyses. However, the presence of local media in the municipality deserves some 
consideration. The average value is 2.58. Still, there are municipalities without a single radio station or 
newspapers and one with a maximum of 77. Lisbon is the outlier. This variable was tested with and without 
the Lisbon observation and the results do not differ markedly, so it is included in the final estimations.  
25	
	
maximum likelihood (REML). REML compensates for the loss of degrees of freedom 
when estimating the fixed effects, producing less biased estimates of the variance-
covariance parameters. 
The first model – Variance Components Model – does not include any predictor, so 
that the fixed effects are simply the intercept at the origin and the random effects are the 
variances/covariances associated with the units of higher hierarchical levels. This base 
model assumes that voter turnout is estimated by an average constant that varies by 
municipality and a random error for each parish in each municipality. This model 
assumes that voter turnout is not influenced by any predictor and the residual varies by 
municipality. The interest in estimating this model lies in the study of the fraction of the 
variance between groups (municipalities) relative to the total variance. If this fraction is 
sufficiently large, the multilevel analysis strategy is justified. The portion of the total 
variance attributable to the municipal level can be estimated by the Intraclass Correlation 
Coefficient (ICC). This is a test often used to check for nested data (Shrout and Fleiss 
1979; Singer 1998; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The ICC is given by the following 
mathematical expression: 
 
where is the variance associated with the random term (variance between 
municipalities) and is the variance of the errors associated with each level 1 
observation at the higher hierarchical level (municipality). The ICC is the proportion of 
the variance in the SMU council turnout rate explained at the municipal level. For 
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example, an ICC of 0 indicates no group effect. Our estimated ICC is 6.77 / (6.98 + 6.77) 
= 0.49. This means that 49% of the total variance in electoral participation is explained 
by differences between municipalities, a typical value for social sciences phenomena. A 
high ICC indicates that the hierarchical linear model is the suitable method for analyzing 
our data. Failing to consider the municipal level would result in type I errors, i.e., levels 
of statistical significance higher than their true value. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Column (1) in Table 7 shows the estimate for the intercept indicating that average 
turnout in SMU elections in all municipalities is 65.41%. This is the value that the 
dependent variable assumes in the absence of any explanatory variables. Column (2) 
displays the results for HLM including voter turnout at the municipal level as the only 
predictor. The result confirms that electoral participation at the municipal level is an 
important driver of turnout at the SMU level. Despite the relevance of this predictor, its 
effect does not seem to crowd out the effect of other variables. First, the coefficient 
remains stable throughout all the different specifications included in Table 7. Second, and 
most importantly, the inclusion of additional variables in specifications 3-6 improves the 
quality of adjustment, indicating their relevance as predictors of SMU turnout levels. 
The next steps in the incremental approach is the inclusion of the socio-economic 
variables, first at the SMU level (column 3) and then at both levels of analysis (column 
4). The fifth column presents the estimates for a random intercepts model including only 
predictors at level 1. The overall significance of the model exceeds 99% (Wald chi2 = 
2519.66) and has a log of REML of -13407.3, both indicating a significant increase in the 
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quality of fit of the model. Since the results are similar to the ones obtained for the full 
model (6), we limit the detailed discussion to the full model. The final column in Table 7 
displays the results of the random intercepts model including both level 1 and level 2 
predictors. The overall significance of this model exceeds 99% (Wald chi2 = 3072.39) 
and the value of the Log REML is -13352.76, indicating an increase in the quality of 
adjustment due to the inclusion of predictors at level 2. 
Theoretical Variables 
Our theoretical variables of interest present somewhat conflicting findings. SMU 
population size is negatively related with electoral participation, validating the first 
hypothesis (H1) of this investigation. An increase of one log in our population variable 
generates, on average, a decrease in turnout of about 4 percentage points. This also 
corroborates prior findings that community size has a negative effect on political 
participation and voter mobilization (e.g., Cancela and Geys 2006; Carr and Tavares 
2014; Geys 2006; Frandsen 2002; Oliver 2001; Oliver and Ha 2007; Tavares and Carr 
2013; Trounstine 2013; Verba et al. 1978). 
The SMU density variable has a negative coefficient. An increase of one log in the 
density variable originates, on average, a decrease in turnout of 0.57 percentage points. 
The result of this variable is consistent with the theoretical expectation that in areas with 
higher population density, elections are likely to be less personal and there is lower social 
pressure to vote (Blank 1974; Geys 2006; Oliver 2012; Overbye 1995). 
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Hypothesis H4 argues that increased territorial fragmentation within the 
municipality decreases turnout due to the voice-substitution effect associated with 
excessive fragmentation. The result is inconclusive. The coefficient is negative but 
misses statistical significance at conventional levels. The level of population 
concentration is positively associated with turnout, suggesting that in municipalities 
where population is more heavily concentrated in one or a few SMUs, these tend to 
display higher turnout levels, therefore confirming H5. 
Control Variables 
The socio-demographic variables conform to the expectations. SMUs with a larger 
proportions of population over 65 years-old tend to display lower rates of electoral 
participation as evidenced by prior research (Blais et al. 2004; Powell 1986). A SMU unit 
with a proportion of elderly population ten percentage points above the average (mean = 
25.74) experiences, on average, a drop in turnout by 2.3 percentage points. There is a 
positive relationship between the level of schooling and electoral participation, which is 
also largely supported by the literature (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Timpone 1998; 
Trounstine 2013; Verba et al. 1995). Substantively, SMU units with a proportion of 
population with complete higher education of about 27% (i.e., 10 percentage points 
above the mean) display, on average, a higher level of electoral participation by 0.8 
percentage points.  
Two of three political variables have the expected effect on voter turnout. The 
margin of victory has a negative coefficient, indicating that the greater the difference 
between the winner and runner-up in elections to the SMU council, the lower the turnout. 
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This is consistent with the literature showing that higher levels of interparty competition 
induce higher rates of electoral participation (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Blais 2006; 
Caren 2007; Tavares and Carr 2013). Substantively, a margin of victory 10 percentage 
points above the average value (27.36) leads to a decrease of 0.8 percentage points in 
turnout. SMUs with a greater number of nonpartisan candidates also tend to have higher 
turnout rates, corroborating the findings of previous studies (Freire et al. 2012). The 
empirical evidence collected shows that each additional list of candidates without party 
affiliation produces an increase in turnout of 0.8 percentage points. The political 
fragmentation variable is not statistically significant. This is partly consistent with other 
studies showing inconclusive results for this variable, but it is also possible that part of 
the explanatory power of this variable is undermined by the margin of victory variable, as 
suggested by Geys (2006). 
The control variables included at level 2 behave according to expectations. The 
most interesting result concerns the local media setting. Municipalities with a larger 
number of newspapers and radio stations display lower turnout rates, indicating that 
media competitiveness is ineffective at reducing information asymmetry between 
candidates and voters and fails to contribute to an increase in mobilization in local 
elections. Income and the level of religiousness are positively associated with turnout, as 
predicted by prior empirical works. More surprisingly, perhaps, age is also positively 
associated with turnout, showing the opposite sign of the same variable at the SMU level. 
Given the methodological problems associated with the measurement of the Age variable 
at an aggregate level (i.e. ecological fallacy), this result should be interpreted with 




The empirical analysis also tests for possible interaction effects between our 
theoretical variables: population size and density at the SMU level and fragmentation and 
concentration at the municipal level. The specifications of the hierarchical linear models 
in Table 8 include three interaction terms, two of which are cross-level interactions. 
Without the estimation of these models combined with the graphical representation on 
Figures 1 to 3, it would not be possible to make a proper assessment of the conditional 
relationship of density, fragmentation and population concentration on the effect of size 
and electoral participation (Brambor et al. 2006).11  
Figures 1 to 3 show how the marginal effects from changes in the relationship 
between SMU population and electoral participation vary depending on the levels of 
population density of the SMU, territorial fragmentation of the municipality, and 
population concentration in the municipality. The plots were produced using Grinter, a 
software written for Stata by Frederick Boehmke and illustrate how the marginal effect 
on Y (SMU turnout) of a unit increase in X1 (SMU population) changes when Z1 
(population density of the parish), Z2 (territorial fragmentation of the municipality), and 
Z3 (population concentration across parishes) are increased from the minimum to the 
maximum value. All other continuous variables in the models are held constant at their 
																																																								
11 These models assume that the effect of the independent variable (X) on the dependent variable (Y), 
depends on the value of a third variable (Z), such that: Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2Z1 + β3X1Z1 + … + ε. Brambor, 
Golder and Clark (2006: 73) state: “As a consequence, the coefficient on the constitutive term X must not 
be interpreted as the average effect of a change in X on Y as it can be in a linear-additive regression model. 
(...) The coefficient on X only captures the effect on Y when Z is zero. Similarly, it should be obvious that 
the coefficient on Z captures the effect of Z on Y when X is zero.” 
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means and dichotomous variables are set to one. The dashed lines in the graphs indicate a 
95% confidence interval. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Column 1 in Table 8 displays the results of an HLM estimation including an 
interaction term between SMU population size and population density. The coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant. Figure 1 graphs the relationship between SMU size 
and voter turnout for the whole range of values of population density. This relationship is 
negative throughout and becomes increasingly negative as density increases. Larger 
SMUs are associated with lower turnout rates and this effect becomes more negative as 
density increases, thus supporting prior arguments and empirical research attesting the 
detrimental effects of population density to civic and political participation (Hoffman-
Martinot 1994). The plot allows us to confirm H3 in which it was assumed that population 
density impacted the relationship between population size and the level of electoral 
participation in the SMU. 
[Insert Figures 1-3 here] 
Column 2 in Table 8 shows the findings for the estimation including a 
multiplicative term between SMU population size and the degree of territorial 
fragmentation of the municipality. Both the coefficient for this interaction and the second 
plot fail to validate H6. The results do not support the idea that SMUs in more fragmented 
cities display lower rates of electoral participation or that the negative effect of SMU size 
on turnout is deepened when a municipality is divided into more SMUs. In the 
Portuguese setting the possibility of citizens “voting with their feet” by moving to 
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another SMU within the same municipality does not receive empirical support, thus 
failing to confirm the argument that fragmentation reduces the role of voice and increases 
the exit threat (Kelleher and Lowery 2004, 2008).  
Finally, the last column (3) in Table 8 displays the estimates for the HLM including 
an interaction term between SMU size and the degree of population concentration across 
SMUs within the municipality. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant. 
Figure 3 suggests that municipalities with lower concentration levels are associated with 
a negative relationship between SMU size and voter turnout. In other words, turnout 
decreases with SMU size and this effect becomes more intense as the concentration of 
population in just a few SMUs also increases. This result conflicts with H7 and the 
expectation that population concentration would mitigate the negative relationship 
between size and turnout.  
The combination of results provided by the three plots allows us to draw some 
conclusions about how population density, fragmentation and population concentration 
mediate the negative relationship between the size of the parish and voter turnout. Two 
mediating variables – density and concentration – compound the negative effect of SMU 
size on electoral participation. In practice, this suggests that larger SMUs in territorially 
dense or heavily concentrated municipalities constitute the most adverse setting for 
electoral participation. It is worth contrasting this result with the findings by Tavares and 
Carr (2013) for Portuguese municipalities. The authors find that highly fragmented 
municipalities also display higher turnout rates in municipal elections. The complete 
picture now indicates that turnout at the municipal level is positively affected by sub-
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municipal fragmentation into SMUs as suggested in Tavares and Carr (2013), but 
fragmentation itself does not affect voter turnout at the SMU level. 
 
 6. Conclusions and Policy Implications  
This work contributes to the literature on political participation and electoral 
turnout in several ways. First, to our knowledge, it is the first time that the complex 
relationship between population size, density, territorial fragmentation, and population 
concentration in a two-tiered local government system – and their impact on voter turnout 
in SMUs − is addressed in the literature. The findings for SMUs support prior research 
conducted at the municipal level suggesting that both size and density decrease voter 
turnout rates. Second, given the pervasiveness of SMUs across many European countries 
and the fact that this second-tier of local government is often elected (Hlepas et al. 2018; 
Klausen, 2018; Lysek, 2018; Swianiewicz, 2018), the results of this empirical study are 
likely to provide some guidance to government officials regarding the structure of their 
local government systems. In particular, the level of fragmentation of Portuguese 
municipalities does not seem to influence voter turnout at the SMU level, suggesting that 
territorial reforms entailing the creation of elected sub-city districts or SMUs are not 
hostage to this fragmentation problem. In contrast, population concentration is found to 
have a positive effect on turnout, thus supporting the argument that concentration in one 
SMU is likely to generate positive spillovers for other SMUs inside the same 
municipality. More importantly, it suggests that turnout can be increased by design, i.e., 
by creating SMUs in areas where population is more heavily concentrated.  
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Prior empirical work conducted in the Portuguese setting showed that highly 
fragmented municipalities are associated with both higher expenditures and larger grants 
to sub-municipal governments (Tavares and Rodrigues 2015). In contrast, the analysis 
presented here suggests that excessive sub-municipal fragmentation does not seem to 
have negative consequences for electoral participation. This finding is consistent with the 
argument that the combination of high rates of homeownership, low residential mobility 
and reduced attributions for SMU governments are unlikely to lead Portuguese citizens to 
‘vote with their feet’. Instead, given this scenario, voting as a ‘voice’ mechanism is likely 
to be preferred over ‘exit’. 
The recent territorial reform of Portuguese SMUs instigated by the Memorandum 
of Understanding signed by the IMF/EU/ECB and the Portuguese government during the 
sovereign debt crisis of 2011 introduced amalgamations that reduced the number of SMU 
units from the 4,259 analyzed here to 3,091. After the institutionalization of this reform, 
empirical work comparing before-and-after turnout rates in Portuguese SMUs will be of 
value to determine whether the reform had a positive or a negative impact on political 
participation.  
The findings included in this research suggest that nonpartisan candidates in SMU 
elections are associated with higher turnout. Future research will explore this link at the 
both the municipal and sub-municipal levels of analysis by investigating the effects on 
turnout of the simultaneous presence of partisan and nonpartisan lists in local elections in 
Portugal. This avenue of research advances our exploration of the role of local 
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Source: DGAL – Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais (2003). 
 










Source: DGAL – Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais (2003). 
 
Number of Registered Voters SMUs % 
Less than 150 177 4.16 
Between 150 and 1,000 1,989 46.79 
Between 1,000 and 5,000 1,637 38.51 
Between 5,000 and 20,000 375 8.82 
More than 20,000  73 1.72 
Total SMUs 4,251 100 
SMUs SMUs % 
Less than 1 sq. km 70 1.65 
Between 1 and 5 sq. kms 943 22.18 
Between 5 and 10 sq. kms 931 21.90 
Between 10 and 50 sq. kms 1928 45.35 
Between 50 and 100 sq. kms 226 5.32 
Between 100 and 200 sq. kms 123 2.89 
Between 200 and 400 sq. kms 29 0.68 
More than 400 sq. kms 1 0.02 




Table 3: SMU Council and SMU Executive Size 
Registered Voters SMU 
Council 
Registered Voters SMU 
Executive 
Less than 1,000 7   
Between 1,000 and 5,000 9 Less than 5,000 2 
Between 5,000 and 20,000 13 Between 5,000 and 20,000 4 
Between 20,000 and 30,000 19 More than 20,000 6 
For each additional 10,000 +1   
 
 
Table 4: Number of SMUs per Municipality 
SMUs Number of Municipalities Percentage 
Less than 10 SMUs 164 53.25 
Between 10 and 20 88 28.57 
Between 20 and 30 27 8.77 
Between 30 and 40 18 5.84 
Between 40 and 50 2 0.65 
More than 50 9 2.92 
Total number of municipalities 308 100.00 




Dependent Variable Indicator Source 
Electoral Participation 
Voter turnout in the 2009 parish council 
election 
DGAI 
Level 1 Variables (Parishes) Indicator Source Expected Sign 
Population Size (X1j) Parish population (log) INE +/- 
Population Density (X2j) 
Population divided by area in square kms 
(log) 
INE +/- 
Age (X3j) Proportion of population over 65 years-old INE - 
Education (X4j) 
Proportion of population with high school 
education 
INE + 
Margin of Victory (X5j) 
Difference in percentage points between the 
first two lists in parish council elections 
DGAI - 
Political Fragmentation (X6j) Number of candidates DGAI - 
Nonpartisan Candidates (X7j) 
Number of candidates without national 
party affiliation 
DGAI + 
Island SMUs (X8j) Dummy variable (1=Island SMU) INE - 
Level 2 Variables 
(Municipalities) 
Indicator Source Expected Sign 
Population Size (Xi1) Municipal population (log) INE +/- 
Population Density (Xi2) 
Municipal population divided by the area of 









Herfindahl Index showing concentration of 
municipal population within its parishes 
INE + 
Age (Xi5) Population over 65 years-old INE - 
Education (Xi6) 
Proportion of population with high school 
education 
INE + 
Income (Xi7) Average monthly earnings INE + 
Local Media Competition 
(Xi8) 
Number of newspapers and radio stations NEAPP + 
Margin of Victory (Xi9) 
Difference in percentage points between the 
first two lists in mayoral elections 
INE - 
Religiousness (Xi10) 





Electoral Participation (Xi11) Voter turnout in the 2009 mayoral elections DGAI + 
 
Table 6: Summary Statistics 
VARIABLES Obs. Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Level 1 (SMUs) 
 
     
Electoral participation (SMUs) 4,117 65.54 9.495 31.36 92.11 
Population (log) 4,260 6.864 1.321 3.434 11.10 
Density (log) 4,260 4.447 1.751 -0.118 10.29 
Age 4,260 25.74 12.71 0 95 
Education  4,260 16.91 8.615 0 78.47 
Margin of victory 4,257 27.36 22.29 0 100 
Political fragmentation 4,259 2.770 1.196 0 7 
Nonpartisan candidates 4,259 0.186 0.424 0 2 
Island SMUs 4,260 0.049 0.217 0 1 
      
Level 2 (municipalities) 
 
     
Electoral participation 4,260 63.43 6.860 44.05 81.11 
Population size 4,260 9.795 1.126 6.064 13.14 
Population density 4,260 4.447 1.459 1.738 8.901 
Territorial fragmentation 4,260 2.311 0.897 0 4.489 
Population concentration 4,260 0.142 0.110 0.0196 1 
Age 4,260 9,333 14,558 71 113,651 
Education 4,143 81.76 4.981 50 100 
Income 4,260 824.3 143.8 616.7 1,693 
Local media 4,260 2.577 8.718 0 77 
Religiousness 4,260 49.85 15.38 0 84 
Urban land use 4,045 2,618 2,233 92.30 12,668 
Margin of victory 4,260 20.62 14.14 0.0700 63.41 
Turnout ratio (SMUs/MUN) 4,117 1.036 0.116 0.546 1.662 
      






Table 7: Hierarchical Linear Regression Models  
(Dependent variable: SMU council turnout rate) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Level 1 (SMUs) 
 
      
Population (log) ---- ---- -3.208*** -3.464*** -3.869*** -4.049*** 
   (0.154) (0.158) (0.165) (0.167) 
Density (log) ---- ---- -0.472*** -0.533*** -0.513*** -0.574*** 
   (0.134) (0.140) (0.130) (0.137) 
Age ---- ---- -0.209*** -0.221*** -0.217*** -0.227*** 
   (0.0146) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0138) 
Education ---- ---- 0.0935*** 0.0765*** 0.0901*** 0.0784*** 
   (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0179) (0.0178) 
Margin of victory  ---- ---- ---- ---- -0.0834*** -0.0826*** 
     (0.00512) (0.00507) 
Political fragmentation ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.315** 0.224 
     (0.154) (0.152) 
Nonpartisan candidates ---- ---- ---- ---- 0.927*** 0.843*** 
     (0.262) (0.256) 
Island SMUs ---- ---- -1.555** -0.760 -1.839*** -0.663 
   (0.689) (0.685) (0.684) (0.689) 
       
Level 2 (Municipalities)       
       
Population size ---- ---- ---- 0.851*** ---- 0.909*** 
    (0.309)  (0.313) 
Population density ---- ---- ---- -0.459** ---- -0.508** 
    (0.206)  (0.209) 
Territorial fragmentation (log) ---- ---- ---- -0.350 ---- -0.313 
    (0.232)  (0.235) 
Population concentration ---- ---- ---- 8.716*** ---- 8.607*** 
    (1.423)  (1.426) 
Age ---- ---- ---- 0.000223*** ---- 0.000232*** 
    (3.01e-05)  (3.06e-05) 
Income ---- ---- ---- 0.00605*** ---- 0.00429*** 
    (0.00153)  (0.00154) 
Local media ---- ---- ---- -0.300*** ---- -0.308*** 
    (0.0470)  (0.0483) 
Religiousness ---- ---- ---- 0.0131 ---- 0.0227** 
    (0.0114)  (0.0115) 
Margin of victory ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- -0.00307 
      (0.0106) 
Electoral participation (MUN) ---- 0.919*** 0.759*** 0.860*** 0.709*** 0.794*** 
  (0.0197) (0.0259) (0.0254) (0.0258) (0.0259) 
Constant 65.41*** 7.242*** 45.92*** 28.23*** 55.31*** 38.81*** 
 (0.412) (1.256) (2.218) (3.190) (2.218) (3.259) 
       
Random effects       
Residual  6.980 6.905 6.330 6.307 6.056 6.036 
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Quality of adjustment       
Log REML -14199.281 -13850.584 -13579.574 -13518.17 -13407.295 -13352.762 
AIC 28404.56 27709.17 27177.15 27070.34 26838.59 26747.52 
BIC 28423.53 27734.46 27234.05 27177.83 26914.46 26880.3 
Wald chi2 ---- 2170.62 2058.49 2683.26 2519.66 3072.39 
       
       
 
      
Observations (SMUs) 4,117 4,117 4,117 4,117 4,117 4,117 
Number of groups (MUN) 307 307 307 307 307 307 




Table 8: Hierarchical Linear Regression Models with Interaction Effects 
(Dependent variable: SMU council turnout rate) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
 popXdens popXfrag popXconc 
Level 1 (SMUs) 
 
   
Population (log) -2.378*** -3.671*** -3.793*** 
 (0.298) (0.299) (0.206) 
Density (log) 1.934*** -0.570*** -0.551*** 
 (0.402) (0.137) (0.137) 
Age -0.189*** -0.226*** -0.229*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0138) (0.0139) 
Education 0.0851*** 0.0791*** 0.0756*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
Margin of victory -0.0805*** -0.0828*** -0.0824*** 
 (0.00504) (0.00507) (0.00506) 
Political fragmentation 0.281* 0.220 0.200 
 (0.150) (0.152) (0.152) 
Nonpartisan candidates 0.789*** 0.847*** 0.856*** 
 (0.253) (0.256) (0.256) 
Island SMUs -0.423 -0.663 -0.751 
 (0.670) (0.692) (0.688) 
Level 2 (Municipalities)    
    
Population size 0.952*** 0.900*** 0.933*** 
 (0.302) (0.315) (0.312) 
Population density -0.527*** -0.509** -0.522** 
 (0.202) (0.210) (0.208) 
Territorial fragmentation -0.329 0.867 -0.331 
 (0.226) (0.798) (0.234) 
Population concentration 8.536*** 8.527*** 21.27*** 
 (1.393) (1.431) (6.187) 
Age 0.000272*** 0.000235*** 0.000225*** 
 (3.02e-05) (3.08e-05) (3.06e-05) 
Income 0.00431*** 0.00432*** 0.00423*** 
 (0.00149) (0.00154) (0.00153) 
Local media -0.356*** -0.316*** -0.302*** 
 (0.0468) (0.0489) (0.0482) 
Religiousness 0.0197* 0.0228** 0.0232** 
 (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0114) 
Margin of victory -0.00363 -0.00347 -0.00327 
 (0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0106) 
Electoral participation 0.801*** 0.794*** 0.783*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0260) (0.0264) 
popXdens -0.334*** ---- ---- 
 (0.0504)   
popXfrag ---- -0.169 ---- 
  (0.109)  
popXconc ---- ---- -1.659** 
   (0.789) 
Constant 24.76*** 36.20*** 37.58*** 
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 (3.770) (3.698) (3.297) 
    
Random effects    












    
Quality of adjustment    
Log REML -13331.2 -13351.6 -13350.6 
AIC 26706.41 26747.14 26745.11 
BIC 26845.51 26886.25 26884.21 
Wald chi2 3254.97 3059.62 3090.84 
    
Observations (SMUs) 4,117 4,117 4,117 
Number of groups (MUN) 307 307 307 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p <.01; ** p <.05; * p <.10; for two-tailed tests. 
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Figure 1:	Contingent Effects of Population Density on the Relationship between 
SMU Size and Electoral Participation 
 
Figure 2:	Contingent Effects of Municipal Fragmentation on the Relationship 
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Figure 3:	Contingent Effects of Municipal Population Concentration on the Relationship 
between SMU Size and Electoral Participation  
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Appendix A - Hierarchical	Linear	Regression	Models 
VARIABLES (A) (B) (C) 
    
Fixed effects 
 
   
Level 1 (SMUs) 
 
   
Population (log) -4.073*** -4.209*** -0.0658*** 
 (0.169) (0.171) (0.00277) 
Density (log) -0.593*** -0.548*** -0.0102*** 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.00231) 
Age -0.228*** -0.235*** -0.00364*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0147) (0.000231) 
Education 0.0774*** 0.0995*** 0.00137*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0187) (0.000297) 
Margin of victory -0.0831*** -0.0810*** -0.00125*** 
 (0.00515) (0.00513) (8.31e-05) 
Political fragmentation 0.209 0.331** 0.00459* 
 (0.154) (0.158) (0.00253) 
Nonpartisan candidates 0.867*** 0.840*** 0.0123*** 
 (0.259) (0.256) (0.00427) 
Island SMUs -0.589 ---- -0.00941 
 (0.752)  (0.0123) 
Level 2 (Municipalities)    
    
Population size 0.952*** 0.661** 0.0203*** 
 (0.328) (0.317) (0.00569) 
Population density -0.555** -0.384* -0.0107*** 
 (0.216) (0.210) (0.00382) 
Territorial fragmentation (log) -0.336 -0.317 -0.0106** 
 (0.246) (0.234) (0.00427) 
Population concentration 8.812*** 10.49*** 0.119*** 
 (1.521) (1.519) (0.0249) 
Education 0.00322 ---- ---- 
 (0.0347)   
Age 0.000235*** 0.000192*** 4.88e-06*** 
 (3.13e-05) (3.48e-05) (5.52e-07) 
Income 0.00390** 0.00460*** 0.000112*** 
 (0.00161) (0.00167) (2.68e-05) 
Local media -0.308*** -0.277*** -0.00645*** 
 (0.0495) (0.0510) (0.000895) 
Religiousness 0.0215* 0.0120 -0.000131 
 (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.000199) 
Urban land use ---- 0.000302*** ---- 
  (0.000113)  
Margin of victory -0.00234 -0.00332 -3.17e-05 
 (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.000194) 
Electoral participation (MUN) 0.790*** 0.831*** ---- 
 (0.0279) (0.0277)  
Constant 39.35*** 38.41*** 1.371*** 
 (4.380) (3.348) (0.0457) 
    
Random effects    
Residual  6.038 5.974 .099 
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(.070) (.070) (.001) 






    
Quality of adjustment    
Log REML -12993.2 -12633.5 3539.7 
AIC 26030.38 25308.93 -7039.49 
BIC 26168.87 25440.61 -6913.03 
Wald chi2 2879.70 2901.90 1120.50 
    
Observations (SMUs) 4,005 3,908 4,117 
Number of groups (MUN) 285 277 307 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p <.01; ** p <.05; * p <.10; for two-tailed tests. 
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